How a Muslim Figjts Agains Hostaility and Criticism

Introduction

Recently, we witnessed a surge in psychological research examining the role of organized religion in human life (eastward.g., Ysseldyk et al., 2010; Coyle and Lyons, 2011; Brambilla et al., 2016). This ascent in interest can probably be explained by recent concerns in the Western world nigh the social and political implications of the surge of "bad religion" (Basedau et al., 2016). As a issue, there has been an intense fence concerning the social risk vs. value of religion and its role within the country (Coyle and Lyons, 2011). Nonetheless, we would debate that the notions of "skilful" vs. "bad" religions, or even unidimensional and dichotomous categorizations of religiosity equally moderate vs. extreme, do not do justice to the issues and pb to simplistic understandings whereby religious extremism is often only seen as a root cause of violence and terrorism.

Such notions and categorizations matter: religious group members are extremely diverse, whereby faith (or even religious extremism) is expressed in very different ways. Problematic too is that such simplistic representations are consequential in that they decide the perception of extremist groups. For example, following 9/11, almost 70% of the U.South. security policies targeted Arabs and Muslims as they were seen to be associated with the adherents of extremist motion (Cainkar, 2009). It appears and so that the term religious extremism engenders negative stereotypes toward detail groups of religious people amid the public and policy-makers. This occurs despite frequent warnings that popular (or journalistic) uses of the term "extremism," associating information technology with terrorism, might atomic number 82 to misunderstandings of particular groups (Schipper, 2003).

To counter such simplistic understandings of religious extremism, we present a multidimensional model of religious extremism that aims to advance our knowledge of religion as a complex and diverse social identity (Ysseldyk et al., 2010). In particular, we claiming the idea that religious extremism manifests merely in one detail fashion and suggest that one dimension of religious extremism (e.g., a radical calendar in politics) may not necessarily be accompanied by extremism in another dimension (e.one thousand., intolerance for diversity in rituals). To understand people's willingness to support violent political action, we therefore need to explore religious extremism on multiple dimensions and exist open to the idea that non every form of religious extremism is associated with a willingness to accomplish goals in violent means.

In this paper, nosotros briefly review the unlike interpretations and understandings of extremism inside religion and propose an alternative model that allows for a more accurate and complete agreement of various dimensions of religion. We argue that our analysis will aid to explain why, despite the perceived similarities that lead outsiders to cluster them together, extreme movements are often in disharmonize with one another over what it ways to exist a good religious person. To illustrate the multidimensional nature of religious extremism, we focus on one particular context: Indonesian Muslims. Nosotros propose that in other faith contexts, the dimensions proposed may need to exist expanded or adjusted to be more authentic and useful.

Moderate vs. Extreme Religiosity

In psychological enquiry, a variety of terms have been used to draw an date with religion, such as religiosity (e.thou., Gibbs and Crader, 1970; Diener and Clifton, 2002; Paloutzian, 2017), religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; Williamson, 2010; Liht et al., 2011), radicalism, or extremism (east.thou., Simon et al., 2013; Webber et al., 2017; Kruglanski et al., 2018). These terms are sometimes used interchangeably, and sometimes contested (e.thou., religious fundamentalism may be used by some scholars to refer to a rigid interpretation of scriptures, in contrast to religious extremism which is often associated with a detail political agenda). Moreover, while religiosity has been linked to positive outcomes such every bit higher well-being (e.g., Carlucci et al., 2015) and life satisfaction (e.g., Bergan and McConatha, 2001), religious fundamentalism and extremism take been linked to more negative outcomes such as prejudice (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992), hostility (Koopmans, 2015), or fifty-fifty armed conflict (Cornell, 2005).

One prominent definition of extremism as a motivation for terrorism is that extremism comprises ideological beliefs about an obligation to bring back the political system to a form suggested past religious norms through violence (Arena and Arrigo, 2005). Therefore, the label of extremist is attributed to groups fighting for their political agendas against mainstream systems accustomed past the majority of people (due east.m., ISIS against the authorities of Syria, or MILF or Moro Islamic Liberation Front against the authorities of the Philippines). Such a definition of extremism associated with political violence is related to broad collective responses against perceived oppression or injustice, and it may be fueled by farthermost religious dogma or non.

The understanding of religious extremism as political has been elaborated by many scholars. For example, religious extremists have been characterized by Sageman (2008) equally seeking martyrdom, and fueled by acrimony regarding perceived injustice. Similarly, Wiktorowicz (2005) proposed a four-stage model of extremism culminating in violence: first, a cognitive openness to new people or new ideas followed past the experiences of personal or group grievance (e.g., discrimination and oppression). Second, the individual takes upwards activism, and the openness tin lead to an credence of the group's extreme norms (due east.g., for violence). Belief in the group'due south claims and willingness to act based on the group'south norms can overcome the thespian'south rational choice perspectives. Thus, when the group'south norm allows the use of not-normative tactics such as violence to gain their objectives, the individuals will intentionally commit violence on behalf of the group.

A like model of religious extremism as the culmination of a trajectory of religious identity into group-based violence is put forward by Silber and Bhatt (2007). The process of being extreme begins with an openness to new thoughts (e.g., in religion) that leads into a process of worldview change. Within this process, a tragic experience tin can pb to the loss of meaning and connection with the initial identity (e.yard., as a religious moderate). The adoption of farthermost behavior and norms fuelled by tragedy is enhanced by the indoctrination procedure operated past an extreme organization. Once more, religious extremism is seen to achieve its ultimate end in the expression of violence past the actor.

The above conceptual approaches to extremism associate extremism with violence committed as a group member. Other more than private-level analyses of extremism operationalize it as endorsement of particular beliefs, such as the duty to engage in violent holy state of war against the enemy (Webber et al., 2017) or sympathy toward extremist groups and back up for their political action (Simon et al., 2013). Some analyses have spanned both private and grouping levels: for instance, Schmid (2014) proposes that either for individuals (i.e., personal beliefs) or groups (i.e., as embedded in salient group norms), the 5 warning signs of religious extremism include belief in absolute truth, endorsement of bullheaded obedience, a quest to establish utopia, conventionalities that the terminate justifies the means, and a declaration of holy war. Similarly, Hogg and Adelman (2013) have divers extremism through the aspects covering grouping level (i.e., a radical agenda, support for violent activity, and authoritarian leadership) and private level (i.east., extreme pro-group action).

While we applaud the development of more nuanced ways to sympathize religious extremism, and the diversity of definitions above, we propose that such distinctions do not go far enough in unpacking the multiple ways in which extremism tin be expressed. To let for the development of this diversity, we adopt a broader definition of extremism and define extremism as the extent to which in that location are articulate norms about appropriate beliefs and very niggling latitude in accepting unlike pattern of norms or item behaviors. Thus, the focus is not and then much on the behavior itself, but on the extent to which particular behaviors are normatively prescribed within a religious group with little room for deviating from that. Therefore, what is perceived every bit extreme in one historical or cultural context may be moderate or mainstream in some other. This usage is in contrast to the definitions proposed by scholars who have associated extremism exclusively with violent intergroup disharmonize.

In line with Sedgwick (2010), we suggest that religion, either at individual or group level, can be expressed along a continuum ranging from moderate to extreme, only get farther by arguing that there is not one continuum, simply multiple dimensions of religion. We hash out the implication of embracing extremism in one dimension but non in others, and contend that the specific constellations of moderate vs. radical features are important when because how religion is expressed. To illustrate the multiple dimensions of religious extremism, we focus on the context of Indonesian Muslim groups. We propose that our analysis should too help to empathize religious extremism in other faith groups only that the dimensions on which moderate vs. extreme religiosity may exist expressed may vary.

The Multidimensionality of Religion as a Framework to Understanding Extremism

We are certainly not the get-go to propose that at that place are multiple dimensions to religion and that these dimensions uniquely connect to important behaviors, such as life satisfaction, stress, youth deviancy. Glock and Stark (1965) suggested that within all religions, there are five distinct components: ideological (behavior), intellectual (knowledge), ritual (overt religious behavior), experiential (feelings or emotions), and consequential (the outcome of religiosity in the world). More than recently, Saroglou (2011) proposed four basic dimensions of faith and individual religiosity that are partially distinct: believing (i.east., representing the cognitive function of religion), bonding (i.e., experiences that bail individuals with perceived transcendent reality, others, and the inner-self), behaving (i.eastward., specific norms and moral arguments defining right and wrong), and belonging (i.eastward., identification with particular tradition, denomination, or a specific religious group). According to these models, and others, the behavioral expression of religion is complex and multi-faceted.

We draw on these frameworks to examine religious extremism. Combining insights from these prior models, we suggest a multidimensional structure to religion that tin help to understand the means in which moderate vs. extreme religion can be expressed. We elaborate our four-dimensional model below, but to summarize: our starting point is the literature on violent religious extremism, where the about mutual dimension identified (and often the simply dimension considered) is the political dimension. In addition, we were inspired past diverse religious movements in Republic of indonesia that take different emphasis on their narratives and actions. For instance, a group named Wahdah Islamiyah has a potent campaign to purify Muslims' theological beliefs and the way religious rituals are conducted, seeking to render to an ideal standard of the past. However, they tend to accept the electric current political system employed to rule the nation. In contrast, Hizbut Tahrir, a banned organization in Republic of indonesia, proposes that Muslims are responsible to recreate an Islamic empire, by rejecting democratic systems and nation-states; however, Hizbut Tahrir does non typically appoint in theological debates. Therefore, alongside the political dimension, nosotros also consider 3 other dimensions which emerge in seeking to empathize religious extremism in Indonesia. A 2nd theological dimension of extremism that is relevant in the Indonesian context is adapted from Saroglou'south (2011) believing dimension: we suggest that religions share theological behavior, and these beliefs might be extreme or moderate. In the Indonesian context, a third, ritual, dimension is inspired past Saroglou's (2011) bonding dimension indicating that religion bonds its members through ritual practices. Some groups have very piffling breadth in how they sympathize and exercise their religious rituals and justify the other practices every bit forbidden innovation. Finally, we propose a social dimension that captures the intra- and intergroup relations of the religious group in Indonesia. Intra-group processes include the specific grouping norms that control the members' moral compass and relations to each other. Intergroup processes include the categorization of in-groups and out-groups as reflected in Saroglou's dimension of belonging, but besides the specific grouping norms controlling relations to members of other faiths.

Before elaborating these dimensions, it is important to notation that the four focal dimensions in the present paper practice not imply that other dimensions do not exist when explaining religious extremism. We propose that the present dimensions are important in understanding religious groups' perspective in the gimmicky Indonesian context. Yet, these four dimensions may become more or less important as a event of particular historical and cultural developments or group comparisons, and this may likewise mean that other dimensions may need to exist considered for other religious groups, and when studying other contexts (see also, Zarkasyi, 2008; Ysseldyk et al., 2010). Below we consider the 4 dimensions in plough, and identify how the dimensions might be used in inquiry.

Moderate vs. Extreme Religion: A Multidimensional Approach Based on Religious Movements in Indonesia

We address religious extremism and the multiple dimensions of religion in Figure 1. Using a classical standpoint that religion is expressed through multiple dimensions (Glock and Stark, 1965; Saroglou, 2011), we suggest to examine a multidimensional religious extremism through separate political, theological, ritual, and social dimensions which may or may non co-vary.

Figure i. Illustration of the extreme-moderate continuum across a multidimensional representation of religion. The figure illustrates a religious group with high extremism in theological and ritual dimensions but moderate beliefs in the social and political dimensions.

We fence that this exercise enables a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of religious extremism equally presented in Table 1. In what follows, we draw attention to the interplay of these different dimensions for dissimilar religious groups. We argue that the four dimensions of religious extremism (i.e., political, theological, ritual, and social) provide a useful framework to locate religious groups, which allows for a better agreement of the style in which their religion is expressed and, importantly, the way in which they aim to achieve religious goals by peaceful or less peaceful ways. Post-obit our outline of the 4 dimensions, we discuss a methodology for measuring context-specific religious extremism and hash out research applications.

Tabular array 1. Mapping out the moderate and farthermost stop points of the four dimensions of religion.

From Moderate to Extreme: The Political Dimension

The mode that faith and politics should chronicle has been a source of intense debate and struggle throughout history (Armstrong, 2000). In the psychological literature, the political dimension of faith has not received much attending (e.g., Diener and Clifton, 2002; Saroglou, 2010) unless information technology is in the context of "bad" religion (Basedau et al., 2016). Nevertheless, as noted above, political behavior and deportment have been the primary focus of "religious extremism" as divers by scholars (e.g., Webber et al., 2017). In this approach, extreme religious movements seek political ability, to promote the adoption of their religious norms through laws or force.

Contemporary religious extremism in the political dimension for Islam is often associated with support for the Caliphate or Muslim empire, which persisted in diverse forms from the 700 southward to 1924 Ad, when the last Ottoman Caliphate was abolished in Turkey. During this time, Islam was associated with both a hierarchical, sometimes expansionist, regal country and a specific system of religious, legal, and cultural practices called sharia law. More extreme groups advocate a radical agenda in political change (e.g., a resurrection of an Islamic empire, a borderless state encompassing all Muslim nations, Ward, 2009; Osman, 2010a). They believe that political norms should be applied to change the current locally adjusted political systems across many Muslim countries. Other, more moderate groups, however, strive for an integration of religious values within the current political systems (e.g., democracy, national state, etc.). They tend to believe that religion should not be politically represented through the legalization of its social order.

The political dimension is typically the near salient dimension for scholars when discussing Islamic religious extremism, as it is for other groups. More than extreme stances on this political dimension such as back up for comprehensive sharia, back up for the resurrection of the Caliphate, and the rejection of democracy were used by Fealy (2004) to place extremist groups in Republic of indonesia (e.g., Darul Islam, Indonesian Mujahedeen Forum, Jihad troops, and Hizbut Tahrir). In improver, the extent to which religious groups approve of and participate in current political systems in Republic of indonesia has been used to identify the more moderate Islamic movements in Indonesia (e.g., Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Ulama, etc.).

Information technology should be noted, all the same, that religious extremism on the political dimension tin manifest in dissimilar means, and that politically extremist groups propose unlike paths to reconcile the constitution with religious norms. For example, some religious groups propose to promote sharia laws through democratic governance, other groups reject the electric current political system past actively candidature for the imposition of sharia without violence; and finally, notwithstanding other groups are willing to utilize violence to destabilize the regime (Come across Ward, 2009; Webber et al., 2017). With or without support for violent means of creating alter, the advocacy toward comprehensive sharia constabulary as well as the revival of an Islamic empire reflects a radical calendar to transform the current established political organization.

In addition to these different views regarding the identify of religion in the state, groups of Muslim also differ in their support for democracy (e.g., Halla et al., 2013). Some of them reject democracy, believing that democracy as a political system is incompatible with Islam (Fealy, 2004; Ward, 2009), that Islamic instructions near all matters relating to life are conspicuously articulated in the Quran and Hadith (the words, behaviors, and approvals of the prophet). This view holds that the musyawara (political discussions to reach a consensus) should only exist used for decisions about detail technical matters, not core principles of social functioning (Nurhayati, 2014). In contrast, some other groups of Muslim do non favor or sanction a particular political system, but rather advocate for principles of tolerance and respect in the governance of all political systems. In this way, the latter groups perceive republic as one way to manage national affairs that is not in conflict with Islam (Ward, 2009; Nurhayati, 2014).

From Moderate to Extreme: The Theological Dimension

Theological beliefs define religion for lay people (Saroglou, 2011), and researchers such every bit Stark and Glock (1968) have highlighted the importance of conceptual representations of God in understanding people's engagement with their religion (meet as well, Granqvist et al., 2010). Different conceptualizations of God provide a meaningful snapshot of a believer's religious worldview. How and then practice more moderate vs. more farthermost forms of religion have shape? We propose that for religious groups that are located at the moderate stop of the theological dimension, beliefs of an impersonal catholic force distanced from worldly affairs (deism) dominate. Moderate views of God as a personal agent (theism; Bader and Palmer, 2011) nowadays a beingness fostering love and not hostility, whereby the paradigm of God is characterized by gracious images (east.thou., The Merciful, The Chivalrous, etc.) allowing different religious interpretations and expanding the acceptance toward dissimilar patterns of norms. In contrast, groups that are located at the extreme end of the theological continuum typically view God every bit a personal amanuensis and embrace names for God that comprise an authoritarian image (e.chiliad., The Compeller, The Conqueror, etc.) leading into rigid interpretations and coercion to suppress different narratives.

There is evidence that these images of God are consequential. For case, normative beliefs associated with an authoritarian prototype of God predict more support for capital letter penalisation (Bader and Palmer, 2011). In addition, an authoritarian formulation (due east.thousand., God every bit the One who strikes downward in anger) has been plant to be associated with a disposition to call back, experience, and act more than punitively toward people considered to be "evil." In dissimilarity, people who characterize God in a more nurturing fashion (eastward.thou., God is beloved) react in a more prosocial way toward others (Granqvist et al., 2010). Historically, an authoritarian image of God was frequently associated with apocalyptic narratives to attract people to catechumen into their group and to forcefulness people to leave their "immoral" norms (Bossy, 2001).

Building on this arroyo, we suggest that variation on the theological dimension of extremism is associated with unlike behaviors to achieve group goals and to show loyalty to the religious grouping. Moderate positions on the theological dimension are indicated by the prominence of gracious images of God and an appreciation of differences in theological beliefs. Conversely, those groups located at the farthermost stop of the theological continuum, embracing an disciplinarian paradigm of God, are more than likely to strike at perceived contrary theological behavior. For instance, we propose that those who believe in an authoritarian, persecuting God will exist more than likely to believe that natural disasters occur more oft to groups who live in ways that God disapproves of. Furthermore, Muslims who endorse an authoritarian conception of God will tend to ascertain the meaning of "jihad" as the duty to engage in a holy war, whereas those located at the more than moderate end of the continuum volition take a more flexible estimation of the word "jihad" as behavior aimed at creating positive change (Esposito, 2002). A like distinction can be witnessed in Christianity: interpretations of the religious duty to build the "Kingdom of God" volition be interpreted by moderates as a spiritual exercise to transform guild toward being more loving, caring, and inclusive, whereas for those Christian groups located at the farthermost end of the theological continuum, this duty is seen as a need to build a physical empire established through crusading armed services ventures (Whitlark, 2011).

From Moderate to Extreme: The Ritual Dimension

Specific rituals allow for the expression of worship or shared feelings with others (Whitehouse and Lanman, 2014), helping to construe notions of organized religion as a lived experience. Many religious people believe that their religious rituals are guided direct by God. For instance, most Muslims believe that God directs their main rituals including their prayers five times per day. However, once organized religion has spread to a wider customs, dissimilar patterns of rituals may emerge from either local customs or from the integration of religious rituals with local traditions. This accommodation of new practices tin often polarize religious adherents into groups who are either open to new influences, or who decline compromises and see them as forbidden innovations. For instance, some Mandinga immigrants in Portugal view a "writing-on-the-mitt" ritual as essential for conferring both Muslim and ethnic identities (Johnson, 2006). In the ritual, children are initiated into Quranic study (and adulthood) by having a poetry written on their hands, which they and then ceremoniously lick off, ingesting the poesy. The ritual is contentious to those who feel that this Mandinga "custom" should be abased to keep Islam pure (Johnson, 2006).

Nosotros propose that intolerance of multifariousness in ritual practices distinguishes moderates from extreme religious groups on this dimension. Moderate religion on the ritual dimension is indicated by tolerant views near the influence of local traditions on the way rituals are performed. Moderate groups can accept the influence of tradition inside ritual as it is not a compulsory ritual and not directly taught by God. Conversely, those groups located at the farthermost end of the theological continuum are more probable to strive to keep religious rituals pure. This often goes together with vigilance to protect the integrity of rituals, but also with intergroup tension whereby extreme groups accuse more than moderate groups of being sinful in their do. For example, the Salafi movement in Indonesia is the strongest grouping to strive for purity in rituals opposing more relaxed Muslim religious traditions such every bit allowing worship in the ancestors' graveyard and the celebration of the Prophet'due south birthday. To some extent, the Salafi movement labels the fellow Muslims who perform those rituals as idolatrous (Musyrik) or even infidels (Kafir). The labels, of form, are psychologically painful for the labeled groups of Muslims. Within the Christian tradition, the Puritan motility is 1 historical example of ritual extremism, rejecting other Christian denominations as insufficiently pure and compromised by lax tolerance of cultural practices.

From Moderate to Extreme: The Social Dimension

The social dimension is concerned with intergroup relations with other groups (religious and otherwise) also as intragroup processes, reflected in norms regarding how to interact with others. Extremists on the social dimension typically have a hostile view of other faiths. In their view, out-groups use sinister conspirators as pawns to influence their religious group members (Fealy, 2004; Kohut et al., 2006). Equally a result, blaming others (e.g., foreigners) for in-group disadvantage is a common narrative to raise support from the public for their calendar. In contrast, more moderate members of a religion often attribute the root causes of in-group problems to internal factors such as anti-intellectual biases, geopolitical instability, and corruption (Lackey, 2013). The moderate groups tend to be more open to complexity in analyzing the causes of the in-grouping's problems. Moderate groups also place greater emphasis on the need to modify to address modernistic concerns.

Consequently, more moderate groups tend to be more than open to collaboration in inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue whereas more extreme religious groups emphasize rejection and avoidance. Interfaith dialogue is often developed by more moderate religious activists to strengthen inter-religious cooperation as a manner to solve common problems (e.g., environmental bug, a cohesive national identity, economic problems, and constabulary enforcement). Yet, more than extreme religious groups oftentimes actively turn down this collaborative effort, equally they perceive inter-religious dialogue equally function of a conspiracy to weaken the organized religion in their religion.

Turning to intragroup relations with other members of the faith community: religion serves equally an organizing set of key values that are captured and expressed in group norms. In the context of social relationships, such group norms may vary in the extent to which they tolerate difference and dissent inside the religious group. At times, harsh attitudes toward dissenters and deviants may prevail when universal values of tolerance and group-specific values clash and individuals are forced to follow group-specific values. For instance, because Islam forbids liquors, some Muslims would similar to force the government to ban the trade in alcohol, without considering that other groups of people take different norms permitting alcohol consumption (Osman, 2010a). In the context of Republic of indonesia, an agile group chosen the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is i of many aiming to force the unabridged nation to follow one version of Islamic social norms (Arifianto, 2017). Hence, the social dimension of religious extremism in our approach is indicated in Indonesia by patterns of externally attributing the causes of in-group disadvantages, and forcing out-groups as well as all in-group members to follow narrow, prescriptive social norms. Naturally, social and political dimensions of religion volition oft be inter-related, especially where groups seek political power to impose their socially farthermost viewpoint. Notwithstanding, in distinguishing the two dimensions, we highlight that some groups will be socially extreme without endorsing extreme political views or seeking political power. Groups who expel internal heretics and who shun contact with infidels without trying to dominate them may fall into this category, in our model.

The Interaction Among Multiple Dimensions of Religious Extremism in Republic of indonesia

As mentioned, the discourse of religious extremism has mostly been related to the political context (Fealy, 2004; Zarkasyi, 2008). To illustrate the importance of non simply exploring the political dimension when understanding religious extremism, nosotros took a closer look at some "extremist" Islamic movements in Indonesia (i.east., that score high in extremism on the political dimension). In an endeavour to understand different forms of extremism more comprehensively, we compared these groups on the other 3 dimensions. Earlier outlining our findings, it is important to note that the classification of a detail group as politically extreme was based on specific historical events and developments: by acts of political rebellion by Darul Islam (Domain of Islam) and Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Country) in 1949. This was also the ground for selecting as farthermost the current political movement Hizbut Tahrir and Islamic defender front (FPI) who have gained back up after the reform of 1998 (Fealy, 2004; Muhtadi, 2009; Osman, 2010a).

There are of import similarities between Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Hizbut Tahrir (HT) beyond all iv dimensions of religious extremism. All groups score loftier in extremism on the political dimensions in that they demand a comprehensive legalization of sharia, a fully Islamic state, recreation of Caliphate, and the abolition of democracy in Indonesia. However, these groups differ from other politically "extreme" groups in Indonesia. For case, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) supports a comprehensive legalization of sharia, only endorses democracy and rejects the revival of the Islamic country and Caliphate (Fealy, 2004). Another group (Laskar Jihad or Jihad Troops) demands comprehensive sharia and rejects democracy, just also rejects the revival of the Islamic state and Caliphate. Both these commonalities and differences accept consequences for their relationship with other religious groups and the way they aim to achieve their goals. While we acknowledge the importance of unpacking the political dimension into constituent elements in some cases, our statement is that to fully understand these groups, we also need to explore where these groups stand on the other 3 dimensions of religious extremism (i.e., theological, ritual, and social dimensions).

In terms of extremism in the theological dimension, notions about an angry God who uses natural disasters punitively are specially important to tease the dissimilar extremist groups autonomously. For instance, some Muslim groups in Indonesia claim that ritual celebration of the local tradition in Palu in Central Sulawesi is a main cause of the earthquake and seismic sea wave that hitting the Indonesian coast in 2018, killing more than than 2000 people. Besides, such attributions likewise dominated when explaining the 2022 convulsion in Lombok Island (Habdan and Baits, 2018). These groups emphasized that the convulsion is a punishment from God to show disapproval of the politically different attitudes that are promoted past the political leader of the Island (Hasan, 2018). Interestingly, such theological behavior do not lead to a button for change of the political system, only only to an invitation to return to Islamic norms every bit they empathise them. This shows that an extreme theological belief may not be correlated with extremism on the political dimension.

Notwithstanding, extremism in the theological dimension may besides exist related to a narrow estimation of jihad equally a core principle in Islam. About Muslim groups believe that jihad means whatsoever zealous try to bring about a better world (Esposito, 2002). However, some groups restrict its interpretation to waging holy state of war, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Salafi Jihadi groups, and Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (Haron and Hussin, 2013). Theological beliefs restricting the pregnant of jihad to waging holy war accept an impact on political extremism, in that these can drive believers into intentions to verbally or physically attack the hated out-groups to engage in jihad.

Finally, some groups that are located at the extreme stop of the ritual dimension are actively campaigning to purify religious rituals and to suppress local traditions that are perceived as deviating from Islam. For example, some groups such as the Salafi movement and al Wahdah al Islamiyah in Indonesia campaign against local traditions and button for the Muslims to relinquish traditions that are perceived as not taught past the prophet (Salman, 2017). Importantly though, these movements practice non use physical violence in their efforts, and they accept and participate in the political organisation in Indonesia. Thus, although these groups tend to be extreme on the ritual dimension, they are more moderate on other dimensions. For example, they have a broader formulation of jihad (i.e., a struggle for positive change), and they exercise not foreclose their members from participating in the current political system.

We have argued that extremism on the social dimension is represented by the tendency to blame others for the group's disadvantage and to force compliance to specific in-group'southward norms. We propose that the trend to forcefully demand adherence to a narrow version of the in-group'due south norms typically results from feeling threatened by out-groups' norms. For example, the Muslim Forum of Bogor (FMB) released a public statement calling on the city mayor to ban the commemoration of Cap Go Meh past Chinese people in the urban center. Fifty-fifty though such social extremism often involves intolerance of norm violations, social extremism is non always followed by extremism on other dimensions (eastward.g., ritual dimension). In particular, social extremism in Indonesia is rarely linked to terror campaigns.

The Consequences of Similarity in Extremism on Multiple Dimensions for Intergroup Relations

The dissimilar ways in which religious groups express their religious identity on the theological, ritual, social, and political dimensions touch on not only the ways they aim to reach their goals just also the ways they chronicle to other religious groups. Using social identity theory every bit a lens to conceptualize intergroup relations (Turner and Oakes, 1986), we propose that the nature of intergroup relations between moderate and farthermost religious groups is adamant by the perceived degree of similarity on the four dimensions. As an analogy, ii groups or more tin can cooperate with each other in their commonage action when they perceive shared values and a larger identity, while breaking into disharmonize when internal differences are salient. For instance, in Republic of indonesia, when the one-time governor of Djakarta (Basuki Tjahaya Purnama aka Ahok) was eventually indicted on charges of insulting a section of the Quran, many Muslim groups were united in their efforts to need punishment of him. A serial of mass protests against the perceived irreverence were attended past hundreds of thousands of people across the country (Fealy, 2016). From an identity perspective, it can be argued that the shared outrage about the former governor who was perceived to have insulted Islam brought different Muslim groups together, and different groups worked together to accost the mutual grievances and the common threats to the superordinate Muslim identity.

Despite this case of unity, information technology is likewise articulate that in that location are many instances when relationships between moderate as well as more than extreme religious groups are more tense. We argue that these tensions tin also be better understood by taking account of the manner in which moderate vs. more than extreme expressions of identity accept shape on the 4 identified dimensions. For example, members of The Prosperous Justice Political party (PKS) and members of Hizbut Tahrir largely take the same stance on the social dimension in that both groups want to generate a new Islamic social guild via the legalization of sharia in Republic of indonesia. However, The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) ofttimes criticizes the members of Hizbut Tahrir because they disagree with the all-time "Islamic" method to attain their shared goal. Their disagreement emerges on the political dimension because PKS supports the autonomous system, as indicated by their participation in the general election, while Hizbut Tahrir absolutely rejects the autonomous system and avoids autonomous politics as a manner to raise political power.

The possibility of compromise between two politically extreme movements depends on the level of identity (i.e., subgroup or subordinate identity) that is activated. When they confront common enemies (eastward.g., a group of Muslims or politicians who strongly back up Indonesian diversity and oppose the legalization of Islamic law), the salience of their superordinate identity (i.e., equally Muslim groups advocating the legalization of Islamic law in Republic of indonesia) may increase, and they may compromise or even integrate. Nevertheless, open disharmonize is also likely, even if the groups are similarly extreme on one dimension, when differences on another dimension are salient.

A like pattern may exist observed amongst groups of Muslims who are identified every bit extreme in ritual dimensions. The Salafy movement and other groups (e.g., Mathla'ul Anwar, Wahdah al Islamiyah, etc.) may unite to produce narratives for ritual purification, and to accuse Muslims who practise local traditions and their supporters of religious error. That is, when they face moderate Muslims (east.g., Nahdhatul Ulama, a group which supports the preservation of local traditions and diversity), they will activate a shared superordinate identity and piece of work together. However, those ritually extreme groups can disharmonize with each other when political differences are salient. For example, many Salafy group members perceive that public protest is an illegitimate action according to Islam, while other groups who share their farthermost identity on ritual dimension perceive it as legitimate tactic. The differences along the political dimension tin lead them into efforts to boss each other, and open contests for power.

The consequence of similarity and departure in the dimensions of religious extremism is relevant previous work on identity and conflict (Haslam et al., 1999). In this model, the salience of subgroup identity (e.g., as an activist of PKS or Hizbut Tahrir) can lead to a trend to seek in-group favoritism, which in turn enhances their sense of self. However, when superordinate identity is salient (e.g., as Muslims who support the legalization of Islamic law in Indonesia, or as Muslims in a broader context), in-group members perceive the members of other Islamic movements as members of the same group. Co-ordinate to this, an approach to religious extremism that focuses solely on 1 dimension will miss the different ways in which the two groups align (east.yard., socially) and are unlike (e.m., politically), which in plough would fail to predict the group members' political alliances or conflict.

Applying the Model

To apply this model in more practical uses, we need to revisit the reason of this multidimensional model development. Unidimensional categorization of moderate vs. extremist atomic number 82 to simplistic understandings whereby people with highly conservative behavior in religion are associated with back up for violence and terror. We propose that extremism is expressed forth different dimensions and the mapping of groups and individuals using multiple dimensions in the model volition assist to understand the patterns of narratives and actions delivered by the groups. This allows for a more nuanced understanding of religious violence whereby nosotros acknowledge that violence can exist motivated by different reasons (not necessarily related to political causes) and that the interplay between different dimensions on which extremism can be expressed tin can either fuel or restrict religious violence (e.g., when a religious group is located at the extremist stop of the political dimensions, simply collectively shared theological beliefs preclude exercising violence).

Moving away from over-simplified representations of religious groups equally politically motivated, the presented framework offers a practical method to understand the multi-faceted nature of extremism. It aims to clarify organized religion at both a group and individual level, augmenting scholarly understanding of the religious dimensions that may be relevant to enable accurate predictions of vehement extremism based on ideological narratives (Kruglanski et al., 2018). Even though the four dimensions of religious extremism that we present hither are informed by prior research on extremism and religiosity, the model that we developed is tailored to the context of Indonesian Muslims and their religious movements. When adopting this model in unlike or wider contexts (e.g., Islamic movements in Pakistan or Egypt, or Christian groups in the Philippines or Northern Ireland), researchers need to recollect carefully about the transferability of the model.

Practically speaking, when adopting the model in other contexts, researchers need to appoint in qualitative exploration of the dimensions religious groups employ to express their religiosity. For every dimension found in a particular context, the researchers should then explore what the indicators are of extremism compared to moderate beliefs. Rich descriptive information about the context and specific intra- or intergroup processes need to be considered to enable a multidimensional model tailored and adapted to specific contexts. In this, some dimensions (due east.chiliad., ritual, political) may not apply to all contexts, while other new dimensions might need to be added.

Such an exploration may well pb to the conclusion that the political dimension is the near important dimension to explain violent behavior and that the other three proposed dimensions (e.g., theological, social, and ritual) are less relevant. Consider for example the current extremism by Rakhine Buddhist in Myanmar against Rohingya Muslims. Violent actions against Rohingya Muslims in 2022 by Rakhine Buddhist were justified as mere crackdowns against suspected Rohingya insurgents, suggesting that the political dimension may be virtually important to understand extremism in this context. However, in other contexts, other dimensions appear to have triggered violence. For instance, and also in the context of Buddhist violence, the terrorist sarin attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 by the cult group Aum Shinrikyo was not so much driven by extremism on the political dimension, simply by extremism on the theological and/or ritual dimension. Specifically, the attack was motivated by a strong consensually shared belief among cult members that violence of this form would wash away their sins and this would allow them every bit a group to survive the imminent Armageddon.

What these examples also make articulate is that the content of the unlike dimensions and the style that moderate vs. farthermost religiosity manifests itself differ for different religious groups. Specifically, while it is of import to understand political violence among Indonesian Muslims in terms of views on sharia laws, in the Myanmar context, political extremism centers on views against minorities and their rights. Or, while theological extremism in Indonesia is concerned with the view of God and ritual extremism relates to tolerance for diffusive from generally accustomed normative ways of enacting religion, for Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, extremism on these dimensions is related to narratives and beliefs effectually Doomsday.

Finally, when applying the model in other contexts, information technology is important to consider new dimensions that may exist important in agreement extremism. For example, Smart (1999) identifies vii dimensions of Buddhist religiosity, including novel dimensions such as the mythological and the experiential. Scholars would discover if these dimensions or others are relevant to differences between moderates and extremists (for example, if Buddhist groups who are more mystical are less likely to be extremist) through exploratory research and pilot testing.

Nosotros, of course, support the prevention of violent extremism, but we likewise support the notion that being extreme in religious behavior is not always linked to back up for employing violent tactics (Austin, 2018). Motivating people to participate in violent intergroup conflict, potent narratives about injustice and expected changes may exist involved (Moghaddam, 2005; Horgan, 2008). Even so, in many contexts (i.east., when the conflict involves religious groups), religious narratives can fuel the willingness to bring together trigger-happy movements on behalf of their group. Past capturing how extremism is manifested across particular dimensions and how these dimensions predict back up for violence, policy-makers can exist more focused in countering the religious narratives that might be employed as the goad of violence and which are non relevant to address (or even counter-productive).

Implications

This paper highlights that religious extremism is not a unified and ubiquitous miracle; rather, religious extremists differ on a number of dimensions in how they express their faith, and consequently, how they aim to achieve important group goals. Using the context of Indonesian Muslim groups to explore these ideas, we advise that religiosity in Muslims can be moderate on one dimension and radical/extreme on another. For example, even though the Salafi movement has been generally identified equally extremist (Haron and Hussin, 2013; Jones, 2014), to understand their extremism, we contend that information technology is important to exist both mindful of the group's extreme position when because theological and ritual dimensions, only besides their comparatively moderate stand politically. For example, even though Salafi movements in Republic of indonesia perceive politics every bit morally decadent (Chozin, 2013; Parveez, 2017), they nevertheless tend to avoid a political fence, and obey the rules of the existing government insofar equally the regime does not prohibit their religious rituals (Haron and Hussin, 2013; Parveez, 2017).

In a similar vein, the group Hizb al-tahrir is extreme in its opinion on the political dimension, as information technology aims to revive the Islamic empire past overthrowing the concept of the nation state (e.g., Ward, 2009; Osman, 2010b). Nevertheless, their activists are moderate on the ritual dimension – they do non criticize other Muslims for their "innovative" rituals (e.one thousand., commemoration of the Prophet'southward birthday) – and they do not support the use of physical violence in pursuing political demands (Come across: Ward, 2009; Schmid, 2013; Parveez, 2017). The group believes that jihad means a holy war, but non equally the way to constitute the Caliphate, but to conquer other nations after the Caliphate is established (Azman, 2015). In addition, this group was actively involved in protests to decline the cultures and norms of other groups in Republic of indonesia on behalf of Muslim as majority (eastward.1000., rejecting the celebration of Valentine's twenty-four hours). We might argue that Hizbut Tahrir is not merely extreme in its political dimension, but also theological and social dimensions. Nevertheless, this group seems to be moderate in the ritual dimension.

Our purpose in this paper is to illustrate that dissimilar dimensions of religion are relevant to agreement religious extremism, and that the four dimensions discussed provide clarity in distinguishing a variety of extreme vs. moderate presentations in the Indonesian Muslim context. Identifying religious extremism as multidimensional helps moving beyond labeling Muslims simply as liberal, farthermost, progressive, moderate, or radical. These labels neglect to capture the various religious groups' similarities and differences across different dimensions, and wrongly cluster together religious actors with quite different historical pasts and futurity trajectories. This "concept creep" (Haslam, 2016) or "jingle-jangle fallacy" (Van Petegem et al., 2013) prevents scholars from identifying the antecedents, character, and consequences of religious extremism in different aspects of life.

We invite scholars to consider extremism in relation to individual and group positions on theological, ritual, social, and political dimensions, and to expect a diversity of contestations within a religion that do not always co-vary. With this arroyo, it is important to be mindful of the fact that when researchers explore the relationship of religious extremism and other psychological processes, the blazon (dimension) of extremism needs to exist considered. For instance, as seen in the narratives of some extremist groups in Indonesia who highlight the "crisis of Islam" every bit a call to seek systemic alter, nosotros predict that perceived injustice toward the religion by outsiders tin raise extremism on the political dimension, but may not impact extremism on the other dimensions as strongly. In this way, we tin can advance knowledge of religious extremism, allowing us to motility toward a more than complete understanding of what is not just one miracle, merely a constellation of related phenomena in an evolving, circuitous religious organization of beliefs and acts embedded in broader historical and cultural change and stability.

Conclusion

Labeling groups or individuals every bit extremist is frequently misleading. The characterization has a narrow pejorative meaning which likewise often assembly extremism with terrorism (e.grand., the Bali bombings, or the Paris attacks). Failure to sympathize the complexity of religious extremism risks stigmatizing some religious groups as irrational and supporting of violence when this is not the example. These negative stereotypes can lead to separation, status loss, and discrimination, also as wasted resource in mis-targeted counter-terrorism initiatives, and squandered political capital. Our promise is that a more comprehensive understanding of religious extremism will facilitate amend insight and nuanced dialogue. Understanding the multidimensionality of faith in the context of religious extremism will aid in accurately depicting this phenomenon, and will facilitate agreement by scholars of the complex group processes associated with religious alter, which have been neglected to date.

Author Contributions

SW conceived of the presented idea. SW wrote the manuscript with support from WL and JJ. SW, WL, and JJ contributed to the final version of the manuscript, responding to reviewers' feedback.

Funding

SW received a PhD scholarship from the Indonesian Endowment for Educational Fund (PRJ-3449/LPDP.three/2016). The research is also supported past an Australian Research Discovery grant (DP170101008) awarded to JJ.

Conflict of Involvement

The authors declare that the enquiry was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed every bit a potential disharmonize of involvement.

Acknowledgments

Nosotros would similar to thank Joshua Rhee, Zahra Mirnajafi, and Sam Popple for helpful editing suggestions on earlier versions of the manuscript.

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